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Abstract
With the popularity of group-oriented applications, secure group communication has recently received much
attention from cryptographic researchers. A group key exchange (GKE) protocol allows that participants
cooperatively establish a group key that is used to encrypt and decrypt transmitted messages. Hence, GKE
protocols can be used to provide secure group communication over a public network channel. However, most of
the previously proposed GKE protocols deployed in wired networks are not fully suitable for wireless network
environments with low-power computing devices. Subsequently, several GKE protocols suitable for mobile or
wireless networks have been proposed. In this article, we will propose a more efficient group key exchange
protocol with dynamic joining and leaving. Under the decision Diffie-Hellman (DDH), the computation
Diffie-Hellman (CDH), and the hash function assumptions, we demonstrate that the proposed protocol is secure
against passive attack and provides forward/backward secrecy for dynamic member joining/leaving. As compared
with the recently proposed GKE protocols, our protocol provides better performance in terms of computational
cost, round number, and communication cost.
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Introduction
Wireless communication technology has widely been
applied to many mobile applications and services such
as e-commerce applications, mobile access services, and
wireless Internet services. Nowadays, people use their
cellular phone or PDA (personal digital assistant) to
access these mobile services. However, most of such
security schemes and protocols deployed in wired net-
works are not fully applicable to wireless networks (i.e.,
wireless local area networks [1], mobile ad hoc networks
[2], cellular mobile networks [3], and wireless sensor
networks [4]) because of the network architecture and
the computational complexity of mobile devices. In
addition, an intruder is easy to intercept the transmitted
messages over a wireless network because wireless com-
munications use radio waves to transmit messages.
Meanwhile, most cryptographic algorithms require many
expensive computations, thus it will be a nontrivial chal-
lenge to design security schemes and protocols for
wireless network environments with low-power com-
puting devices [5,6].
With the popularity of group-oriented applications
such as collaboration works and electric conferences,
secure group communication has received much atten-
tion from cryptographic researchers. A group key
exchange (GKE) protocol allows that participants estab-
lish a group key to encrypt/decrypt the transmitted mes-
sages. Thus, GKE protocols can be used to provide
secure group communication. In 1982, Ingemaresson et
al. [7] proposed the first GKE protocol relied on the
two-party Diffie-Hellman scheme [8]. Subsequently, dif-
ferent types of GKE protocols were presented such as
constant-round GKE [9-13] and linear-round GKE
[14-17]. However, these previously proposed GKE proto-
cols did not deal with the computing capability of
mobile devices in wireless mobile networks.
Actually, considering wireless network environments
such as wireless local area networks [1] and cellular
mobile networks [3], they may be regarded as asym-
metric (imbalanced) wireless networks. An imbalanced
wireless network consists of mobile clients and a power-
ful node. Generally, mobile clients may use some mobile
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devices (i.e., cellular phone or PDA) to access mobile
applications through the powerful node. If such mobile
clients want to perform a secure conference using their
mobile devices through cellular mobile networks or
wireless local area networks, they must establish a
secure group key to encrypt/decrypt the transmitted
messages. Considering the computing capability of
mobile devices, a flexible approach is to shift the com-
putational burden from the mobile devices to the
powerful node. This approach reduces the computa-
tional costs on mobile nodes. Consequently, several
group key agreement protocols [18-22] for the imbal-
anced wireless network have been proposed.
In 2003, Boyd and Nieto [18] presented a one-round
GKE protocol. Their protocol is efficient for imbalanced
wireless networks, but it lacks forward secrecy. Bresson
et al. [19] proposed a two-round GKE protocol for
imbalanced wireless networks. Unfortunately, their pro-
tocol provides only partial forward secrecy [20]. This
partial forward secrecy means that leaking the mobile
nodes’ private keys do not reveal any information about
the previous establishment group keys, but leaking the
powerful node’s private key will enable an adversary to
reconstruct the previous group keys. Subsequently, Nam
et al. [20] also presented an improvement on the proto-
col proposed by Bresson et al. In 2007, Tseng [21]
demonstrated that the Nam et al.’s protocol has a secur-
ity weakness. In their protocol, the powerful node can
pre-determine the group key. That is, Nam et al.’s pro-
tocol is not a contributory GKE protocol. For repairing
this weakness, Tseng also proposed a secure group key
exchange protocol for imbalanced wireless networks.
However, Tseng’s GKE protocol does not deal with
dynamic member joining/leaving functionality. Note that
the dynamic joining/leaving functionality means that
other participants need not to re-run the protocol when
a participant joins or leaves the group. For a GKE proto-
col, it is important to provide this dynamic functionality,
especially for wireless network environments. For pro-
viding dynamic joining/leaving functionality, Chuang
and Tseng [22] recently proposed a dynamic group key
exchange protocol for imbalanced wireless networks.
However, their protocol requires three rounds to estab-
lish a group key.
Since the recently proposed GKE protocols [20-22] for
wireless network environment are non-authenticated
ones. By its very nature, a non-authenticated group key
exchange protocol cannot provide participant and mes-
sage authentication, so it must rely on the authenticated
network channel [1,3] or use other schemes [23-25] to
provide authentication in advance. Here, as like the
recently proposed GKE protocols [20-22], we assume
that each mobile client and the powerful node have
already authenticated mutually. Here, we focus on the
design of a non-authenticated GKE protocol. In this
article, we propose a new group key exchange protocol
with the dynamic property for wireless network environ-
ments. Under several security assumptions, we will
prove that the proposed protocol is secure against
passive attack and provides forward/backward secrecy
for dynamic member joining/leaving. Meanwhile, we
demonstrate that the proposed protocol also satisfies the
contributiveness property. As compared with the
recently proposed GKE protocols, our protocol provides
better performance in terms of computational cost,
round number, and communication cost.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows.
In the next section, we present the security assumptions
and the security requirements for a dynamic GKE proto-
col. In ‘A concrete dynamic GKE protocol’ section, we
propose a concrete dynamic GKE protocol. Security
analysis of the proposed protocol is demonstrated in
‘Security analysis’ section. In ‘Performance analysis and
discussions’ section, we make performance analysis and
comparisons. The conclusions are given in ‘Conclusions’
section.
Preliminaries
In this section, we present the security requirements of
dynamic group key exchange protocol, as well as several
security assumptions.
Notations
The following notations are used throughout the article:
• p, q: two large primes satisfying p = 2q + 1.
• Gq: a subgroup of Zp* with the order q.
• g: a generator of the group Gq.
• H: a one-way hash function, H:{0, 1}* ® Zq*.
• SID: a session identity is public information. Note
that each session is assigned a unique SID.
Security requirements for dynamic GKE protocol
Here, we define the security requirements of a dynamic
GKE protocol as follows:
• Passive attack: This attack means that a passive
adversary cannot compute the group key by eaves-
dropping on the transmitted messages over a public
channel or efficiently distinguish the group key from
a random string.
• Forward secrecy: When a new member joins the
group, he/she cannot compute the previous estab-
lished group keys to decrypt the past encrypted
messages.
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• Backward secrecy: When an old member leaves the
group, he/she cannot compute the subsequent group
keys to decrypt the future encrypted messages.
• Contributiveness: In the group, any participants
cannot predetermine or predict the resulting group
key. In other words, each participant can confirm
that her/his contribution has been involved in the
group key.
Security of a dynamic GKE protocol
We say that a dynamic group key exchange protocol is
secure, if (1) it is secure against passive attack; (2) it
provides forward/backward secrecy for joining/leaving;
(3) it satisfies contributiveness.
Security assumptions
For the security of our proposed dynamic group key
exchange protocol, we need the following hard problems
and assumptions [26,27].
• Decision Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem: Given
ya = gxa mod p and yb = gxb mod p for some xa, xb Î
Zq*, the DDH problem is to distinguish two tuples
(ya, yb, gxaxb mod p ) and (ya, yb, R Î Gq).
• DDH assumption: There exists no probabilistic
polynomial-time algorithm can solve the DDH pro-
blem with a non-negligible advantage.
• Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem:
Given a tuple (g, gxa mod p, gxb mod p ) for some xa,
xb Î Zq*, the CDH problem is to compute the value
gxaxb mod p ∈ Gq.
• CDH assumption: There exists no probabilistic
polynomial-time algorithm can solve the CDH pro-
blem with a non-negligible advantage.
• Hash function assumption: A secure one-way hash
function H : X = {0, 1}∗ → Y = Z∗q must satisfy fol-
lowing requirements [28]:
(i) For any y Î Y, it is hard to find x Î X such that
H(x) = y.
(ii) For any x Î X, it is hard to find x’ Î X such that
x’ ≠ x and H(x’) = H(x).
(iii) It is hard to find x, x’ Î X such that x ≠ x’ and
H(x) = H(x’).
A concrete dynamic GKE protocol
In this section, we present a new group key exchange
protocol with the member joining/leaving functionality.
Without loss of generality, let {U0, U1, U2,..., Un} be a
set of participants who want to generate a group key in
an imbalanced wireless network, where U0 is a powerful
node and U1,..., Un are n mobile clients with the limited
computing capability. Our proposed dynamic GKE
protocol is depicted in Figure 1 and the detailed steps
are described as follows.
Step 1: Each client Ui (1 ≤ i ≤ n) selects a random
value ri ∈ Z∗q and computes zi = gri mod p. . Then, each
Ui sends (Ui, zi) to the powerful node U0.
Step 2: The powerful node U0 first selects two random
values r0, r Î Zq* and computes z0 = gr0 mod p.. Upon
receiving n pairs (Ui, zi) (1 ≤ i ≤ n), U0 computes
xi = zir0 mod p and yi = H(xi||SID)⊕r for i = 1, 2,..., n.
Finally, the powerful node U0 computes SK = H(r||y1||
y2||...||yn||SID) and broadcasts (U0, y1, y2,..., yn, z0, SID)
to all clients.
Step 3: Upon receiving the messages (U0, y1, y2,..., yn,
z0, SID), each client Ui (1 ≤ i ≤ n) can compute
y′i = H(xi||SID′) ⊕ r′ and uses r to obtain the group key
SK = H(r||y1||y2||...||yn||SID).
Member joining phase. Assume that a new client Un
+1 want to join the group. This phase is depicted in Fig-
ure 2 and the detailed steps are described as follows.
Step 1: Only the client Un+1 randomly selects a value
rn+1 ∈ Z∗q and computes zn+1 = grn+1 mod p . Then, Un+1
sends (Un+1, zn+1) to the powerful node U0.
Step 2: Upon receiving the pair (Un+1, zn+1), the
powerful node U0 computes xn+1 = zn+1
r0 mod p and
selects a new value r’ ÎR Zq*. Then, U0 computes
yi ⊕ H(z0ri ||SID) = r′ for i = 1, 2,..., n+1 and
SK ′ = H(r′||y′1||y′2|| · · · ||y′n+1||SID′) . Finally, the powerful









Step 3: Upon receiving the messages
(U0, y′1, y
′
2, . . . , y
′
n+1, z0, SID
′) , each client Ui (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
can compute y′i ⊕ H(xi||SID′) = r′ and uses r’ to obtain
a new group key SK ′ = H(r′||y′1||y′2|| · · · ||y′n+1||SID′).
The client Un+1 first computes xn+1 = z0
rn+1 mod p and
y′n+1 ⊕ H(xn+1||SID′) = r′ to obtain the group key SK’.
Member leaving phase. Without loss generality, we
assume that the client Un+1 would like to leave the
group. This phase is depicted in Figure 3 and the
detailed steps are described as follows.
Step 1: The powerful node U0 first selects a new ran-
dom value r′′ ∈ Z∗q . Then, U0 computes
y′′i = H(xi||SID′′) ⊕ r′′ for i = 1, 2,..., n and
SK ′′ = H(r′′||y′′1||y′′2|| · · · ||y′′n||SID′′). Finally, the powerful
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′′) to all other
clients.
Step 2: Upon receiving the message
(U0, y′′1, y
′′
2, . . . , y
′′
n, SID
′′), each client Ui (1 ≤ i ≤ n) can
compute y′′i ⊕ H(xi||SID′′) = r′′ and uses r″ to obtain a
new group key SK ′′ = H(r′′||y′′1||y′′2|| · · · ||y′′n||SID′′).
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Security analysis
In this section, we demonstrate that our proposed GKE
protocol can achieve the security requirements defined
in ‘Security requirements for dynamic GKE protocol’
subsection that include withstanding passive attack,
satisfying contributiveness and providing forward/back-
ward secrecy.
Passive attacks
Theorem 1. Under the decision Diffie-Hellman assump-
tion, the proposed group key exchange protocol is secure
against passive attacks.
Proof. Assume that there exists an adversary A who
tries to obtain the information about the group key by
eavesdropping the transmitted messages over a public
channel. Suppose that the adversary A may obtain all
transmitted messages (z0, zi, yi, SID) for i = 1, 2,..., n,
where z0 = gr0 mod p, zi = gri mod p, and
yi = H (xi||SID) ⊕ r = H(z0ri ||SID) ⊕ r. Here, we want
to prove that the adversary A cannot get any informa-
tion about the group key SK = H(r||y1||y2||...||yn||SID).
Under the decision Diffie-Hellman assumption, we
prove that two tuples (zi, yj, SK = H(r||y1||y2||...||yn||
SID)) and (zi, yj, R1) are computationally indistinguish-
able for 0 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤ n, where R1 Î Gq.
By contradiction proof, we assume that the adversary
A within a polynomial-time can efficiently distinguish
(zi, yj, SK = H(r||y1||y2||...||yn||SID)) and (zi, yj, R1) for 0
≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤ n. Then, we can construct an algo-
rithm A1 that can efficiently distinguish a decision Dif-
fie-Hellman (DDH) problem (ua, ub, grarb mod p ) from
(ua, ub, R2), where ua = gra mod p and ub = grb mod p
for ra, rb ∈ Z∗q and R2 Î Gq. Without loss generality, we
set ua = z0 and ub = y1 as the inputs of the algorithm




0 mod p, z2 = z
t2






1 mod p, y3 = y
t2















  ]8   ]8  QQ ]8
3RZHUIXOQRGH8
SJ]=UU UT5 PRG  =∈
__________  6,'\\\U+6. Q=


































































































Figure 1 Proposed dynamic group key exchange protocol.
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Now, the algorithm A1 has constructed all (zi, yj) and
then computes R1 = H(y1⊕H(R2||SID)||y1||y2||...||yn||
SID) for 0 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤ n. Finally, A1 sends (zi, yj,
R1) to the adversary A.
The adversary A can determine whether SK is equal to
R1. If it is true, then grarb mod p = R2. This means that
the algorithm A1 can run A as a subroutine to efficiently
distinguish two tuples (ua, ub, grarb mod p ) from (ua, ub,
R2). It is a contradiction for the decision Diffie-Hellman
assumption. Thus, the proposed dynamic key exchange
protocol is secure against passive attacks.■
Contributiveness
Theorem 2. By running the proposed group key
exchange protocol, an identical group key is established
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Figure 2 Member joining phase.
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Figure 3 Member leaving phase.
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by the group participants. Then, each participant may
ensure that her/his contribution has been involved in the
group key.
Proof. In the proposed protocol, after the powerful
node U0 broadcasts (U0, y1, y2,..., yn, z0, SID) to all clients,
each client Ui(1 ≤ i ≤ n) can use its own secret ri to com-
pute the value r and then obtains an identical group key




































































Set V = y1 ⊕ H(zr10 ||SID) = y2 ⊕H(zr20 ||SID) = · · · = yn ⊕ H(zrn0 ||SID).
It implies
y1 = H(z0r1 ||SID) ⊕ V, y2 = H(z0r2 ||SID) ⊕ V, . . . , yn = H(z0rn ||SID) ⊕ V .
Obviously, each yi includes the participant Ui’s secret


































each participant may ensure that her/his contribution
has been involved in the group key SK. Therefore, our
proposed GKE protocol provides contributiveness.■
For convenience to prove the forward/backward
secrecy for member joining/leaving, we first prove a
lemma as follow.
Lemma 3. Assume that three secret parameters a, b,
and c are randomly selected from Zp*. If a passive adver-
sary knows two values H(a)⊕b and H(a)⊕c, then the
secret b is un-computable under the hash function
assumption. Furthermore, the secret a is also un-compu-
table under the same assumption.
Proof. Note that if the passive adversary can get the
secret b from U = H(a)⊕b and V = H(a)⊕c, then it
implies that the adversary can obtain H(a) from U and
V. In the following, we want to prove that the passive
adversary is unable to get H(a) from U and V under the
hash function assumption.
By the contradiction proof, assume that there exists an
algorithm A can obtain the value H(a) from H(a)⊕b and H
(a)⊕c within a polynomial-time. If the algorithm A cannot
get a, then it is hard to find x = a such that H(x) = H(a) and
x ≠ a such that H(x) = H(a) by the hash function assump-
tion (ii). Thus, the algorithm A must get a. That is, there
exists an algorithm A which is able to obtain the secret a
from H(a)⊕b and H(a)⊕c within the polynomial-time.
Based on the algorithm A, we can construct another
algorithm A1 which is able to get x from H(x) within
the polynomial-time as follows. Set the value H(x) as
input of the algorithm A1. A1 executes the following
procedures to obtain x:
(1) The algorithm A1 calls the algorithm A with the
input H(x)⊕R, where R is a nonce.
(2) The algorithm A1 can obtain x from the algo-
rithm A.
According to the above procedures, the algorithm A1
can get x from H(x) within the polynomial-time. This is
a contradiction for the one-way property of the hash
function assumption. Therefore, no passive adversary
can compute the secret b from H(a)⊕b and H(a)⊕c
under the hash function assumption. Certainly, the
secret a is also un-computable under the same
assumption.■
Forward secrecy
Theorem 4. Under the computation Diffie-Hellman
(CDH) and the hash function assumptions, the proposed
group key exchange protocol provides forward secrecy for
member joining.
Proof. Assume that a new client Un+1 would like to join
the group. According to the proposed protocol, Un+1
sends (rn+1 ∈ Z∗q , zn+1 = grn+1 mod p) to the powerful node
U0. Then, U0 selects r
′ ∈ Z∗q and computes
y′i (1 ≤ i ≤ n + 1) with a new SID’. Finally, U0 broadcasts
(U0, y′1, y
′
2, . . . , y
′
n+1, z0, SID
′) to all other clients. Hence,
all participants can compute a new group key
SK ′ = H(r′||y′1|| · · · ||y′n+1||SID′) , where r′ = y′i ⊕ H(zri0 ||SID′).
Here, we want to prove that the client Un+1 cannot
compute the previous group key SK = H(r||y1||...||yn||
SID). We may assume that Un+1 has recorded the pre-
vious transmitted messages
(z0 = gr0 mod p, zi = gri mod p, yi = H (xi||SID) ⊕ r, SID)
for i = 1, 2,..., n. Obviously, if Un+1 can get the value r
or xi for some i Î {1, 2,..., n}, then the key SK can be
computed. Hence, we want to prove that the following
two cases do not occur.
Case I. Un+1 can obtain xi from zi (0 ≤ i ≤ n). Due to
xi = z
r0
i mod p = g
r0ri mod p , given a tuple
(g, z0 = gr0 mod p, zi = gri mod p) , it is hard to compute
gr0ri mod p = xi , by the computational Diffie-Hellman
(CDH) assumption. Thus, Un+1 obtaining xi from zi is
impossible.
Case II. Un+1 can get the value r or xi from (yi, y
′
i ,
SID, SID’) for i = 1, 2,..., n, where yi = H(xi||SID) ⊕ r
and y′i = H(xi||SID′) ⊕ r′ . Without loss generality, we set
a = xi||SID = xi||SID’, b = r, and c = r’ such that yi = H
(a)⊕b and y′i = H(a) ⊕ c . By Lemma 3, we have proven
that the values a and b are un-computable under the
hash function assumption. Thus, to obtain the value r
or xi is also impossible.
Therefore, the client Un+1 cannot compute the pre-
vious group key SK by Cases I and II. This means that
the proposed group key exchange protocol provides for-
ward secrecy.■
Backward secrecy
Theorem 5. Under the computation Diffie-Hellman
(CDH) and the hash function assumptions, the proposed
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dynamic group key exchange protocol provides backward
secrecy for member leaving.
Proof. Without loss generality, we assume that an old
client Un+1 wants to leave the group. According to the
proposed protocol, the powerful node U0 selects a new
random value r′′ ∈ Z∗q and computes y′′i (1  i  n)
with a new SID“. Then, U0 broadcasts
(U0, y′′1, y
′′
2, . . . , y
′′
n, SID
′′) to all other participants. Hence,
all participants can compute a new group key
SK ′′ = H(r′′||y′′1|| · · · ||y′′n||SID′′).
Here, we prove that the client Un+1 cannot compute
the later group key SK ′′ = H(r′′||y′′1|| · · · ||y′′n||SID′′). We
may assume that Un+1 has recorded all transmitted mes-
sages
(z0 = gr0 mod p, zi = gri mod p, yi = H(xi||SID) ⊕ r, y′′i = H(xi||SID′′) ⊕ r′′, SID′′)
for i = 1, 2,..., n, where xi = z
ri
0 mod p . Due to the key
SK ′′ = H(r′′||y′′1|| · · · ||y′′n||SID′′) and
r′′ = y′′i ⊕H(xi||SID′′) , if Un+1 can get the value r″ or xi
for some i Î {1, 2,..., n} then SK″ can be computed.
However, Un+1 cannot obtain the values r″ and xi from
(z0, zi, yi, y′′i , SID
′′) by the similar method in the proof of
Theorem 4. Thus, the client Un+1 cannot compute the
later group key SK″. Finally, the proposed group key
exchange protocol provides backward secrecy.■
Performance analysis and discussions
For convenience to analyze the performance of our pro-
posed dynamic GKE protocol, we first define the follow-
ing notations:
• Texp: The time of executing a modular exponentia-
tion operation.
• Tinv: The time of executing a modular inverse
operation.
• Tmul: The time of executing a modular multiplica-
tion operation.
• TH: The time of executing a one-way hash function
operation.
• |m|: the bit length of a transmitted message m.
Here, let us discuss the computational cost for each
client Ui (1 ≤ i ≤ n). In Step 1, the client Ui computes
zi, thus it requires Texp. Upon receiving (U0, y1, y2,..., yn,
z0, SID), the client Ui computes r and then uses r to
obtain the group key SK, thus Texp+2TH is required in
Step 3. The required computational cost for each client
Ui is 2Texp + 2TH. Considering the computational cost
of the powerful node, the powerful node might be
regarded as a wired gateway with less computing-restric-
tion. In Step 2 of the proposed protocol, the powerful
node U0 computes z0, xi and yi for i = 1, 2,..., n. Then
the powerful node U0 computes SK. In total, it requires
(n + 1)Texp + (n + 1)TH. Furthermore, let us discuss the
computation cost required for member joining/leaving.
The powerful node’s computation cost for joining and
leaving requires Texp + (n + 2)TH and (n + 1)TH, respec-
tively. Each client’s computation costs for joining/leaving
requires 2TH, except for the joining client.
In Table 1, we demonstrate the comparisons between
our GKE protocol and the recently proposed GKE pro-
tocols [20,22] in terms of the number of rounds, the
computational cost and the communication complexity
required for each client, the powerful node, and the
dynamic member joining/leaving, respectively. It is easy
to see that the performance of our GKE protocol is bet-
ter than Nam et al.’s [20] and the Chuang-Tseng [22]
GKE protocols. Meanwhile, our GKE protocol also pro-
vides the member dynamic joining/leaving functionality
and satisfies contributiveness.
Since Nam et al.’s protocol [20], the Chuang-Tseng
protocol [22], and our proposed protocol are non-
authenticated GKE ones, they must rely on an authen-
ticated channel or apply other schemes to provide
authentication like the Katz-Yung complier [12].
Table 1 Comparisons between our protocol and the recently proposed protocols
Nam et al.’s protocol [20] Chuang-Tseng protocol [22] Our protocol
Number of rounds 2 3 2
Contributiveness property No Yes Yes
Computational cost of each client 2Texp + Tmul + TH 2Texp + 3TH 2Texp+2TH
Uni-casting message size sent by each participant |p| |p| + |q| |p|
Computational cost of the powerful node (n+2)Texp + nTinv + 2nTmul + TH (n + 1)Texp + (2n + 1)TH (n + 1)Texp + (n + 1)TH
Broadcasting message size sent by the group controller (n + 1)|p| n(|p| + |q|) (n + 1)|p|
Providing the member dynamic functionality No Yes Yes
Computational cost for joining (each client) × 3TH 2TH
Computational cost for leaving (each client) × 3TH 2TH
Computational cost for joining (powerful server) × Texp + (2n + 1)TH Texp + (n + 2)TH
Computational cost for leaving (powerful server) × Texp + (2n + 1)TH (n + 1)TH
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Using their complier into a non-authenticated GKE
protocol, the protocol can be transformed into an
authenticated GKE. Nevertheless, it will additionally
increase a new round, one signature generation, and n
- 1 signature verifications for each client. Thus, the
computational cost is too expensive for each mobile
client. The other option is that each client needs not
to authenticate the other clients. It only authenticates
the powerful node. Certainly, the powerful node must
be trusted. Then, it requires single signature genera-
tion and verification for each client. Naturally, the
powerful server will additionally add one signature
generation and n - 1 signature verifications. Fortu-
nately, some known wireless network environment
such as cellular mobile networks [3] and wireless local
area networks [1], these clients must be authenticated
before they want to connect to their network systems.
In addition, the powerful node may apply some exist-
ing authentication protocols [23-25] to authenticate
the mobile client in advance.
Conclusions
In this article, we have proposed a new dynamic GKE
protocol for wireless network environments. Under the
decision Diffie-Hellman (DDH), the computation Diffie-
Hellman (CDH), and the hash function assumptions, we
have proven that the proposed protocol is secure against
passive attacks and provides forward/backward secrecy
for member joining/leaving. Meanwhile, we have proven
that the proposed protocol satisfies contributiveness. As
compared with the recently presented GKE protocols,
we have demonstrated that our protocol provides better
performance in terms of computational cost, round
number, and communication cost.
List of Abbreviations
CDH: computation Diffie-Hellman; DDH: decision Diffie-Hellman; GKE: group
key exchange; PDA: personal digital assistant.
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